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Under the Direction of Jared Poley 
 
ABSTRACT 
Prior to Germany’s emergence as an imperial power in 1884, scholarly knowledge of the 
Orient was only deemed useful to a handful of academics, largely in part because oriental 
scholarship’s primary emphasis was the study of classical languages and ancient manuscripts. 
German colonialism, on the other hand, required the creation of a new body of oriental 
knowledge, one that was firmly rooted in the contemporary world instead of antiquity. In 1907, 
Carl Heinrich Becker published Christianity and Islam, one of the first pieces of scholarship to 
examine the modern Orient with a modern methodology. In particular, it was Becker’s adoption 
of the sociology of religion, a concept pioneered by Max Weber and Émile Durkheim, which 
allowed him to interpret the modern Orient in a way not previously possible under the 
philological tradition that defined oriental studies for previous generations of scholars. 
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1 INTRODUCTION: AN ORIENTAL RENAISSANCE 
 
The unification of Germany in 1871 ushered in a new era of oriental studies. The 
consolidation of political authority by the Kingdom of Prussia over the German speaking peoples 
of Central Europe was achieved on the back of consecutive military victories over Denmark, 
Austria, and France, and the official proclamation of the German Empire in the Hall of Mirrors at 
Versailles signaled the arrival of the Germans as a major player on the European stage. 
Economic integration, expedited by the construction of new railways, propelled German 
industries and commercial operations to new heights. During the years immediately following 
unification, currency reform and French repatriations injected substantial amounts of paper 
money into the economy.1 Moreover, the creation of a centralized government and the rapid 
privatization of wealth in German society severely mitigated the cultural influence of religious 
and clerical authority. The end result for many orientalist scholars was a newfound sense of 
academic freedom and the establishment of a new patronage system. According to Suzanne 
Marchand, these convergent developments “generated a great leap forward in oriental studies, 
one which deserves to be called a Second Oriental Renaissance.”2 
The French historian Edgar Quinet first developed the notion of the Oriental Renaissance in 
Génie des Religions (1841), but the term did not enter the historiography of German Orientalism 
until Raymond Schwab’s The Oriental Renaissance (1950). In keeping with the spirit of Quinet’s 
work, Schwab argued that the arrival of Sanskrit texts in Europe during the eighteenth century 
“produced an effect equal to that produced in the fifteenth century by the arrival of Greek 
                                                 
1
 Mary Fulbrook, A Concise History of Germany, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 
122-125. 
2
 Suzanne L. Marchand, German Orientalism in the Age of Empire: Religion, Race, and Scholarship 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 158. 
2 
manuscripts and Byzantine commentators after the fall of Constantinople.”3 While the classical 
Renaissance introduced Europeans to Greek and Roman antiquity, the Oriental Renaissance 
introduced Europeans to the rest of the world. For Schwab, Europe’s rediscovery of the Orient 
was characterized by three essential features: “the ability to decipher unknown alphabets, 
acquired in Europe after 1750,” the individual efforts of orientalists like Anquetil-Duperron and 
Sir William Jones, and a strong affiliation with Romantic literature and poetry.4 In German 
Orientalism in the Age of Empire, Suzanne Marchand expands on Schwab’s thesis by identifying 
a second renaissance in the history of German oriental studies. Schwab’s periodization of the 
Oriental Renaissance spanned the course of two centuries, and the movement’s most notable 
legacy was the gradual proliferation of the Orient into the European imagination. Marchand’s 
Second Oriental Renaissance, on the other hand, was defined by the rapid transformation of the 
Orient into a modern subject between the years 1871 and 1900.5 
The present study takes the Second Oriental Renaissance as its point of departure. It was 
during this period that the primary emphasis of oriental scholarship shifted from the ancient to 
the modern Orient. Marchand explains this radical shift in terms of Germany’s emergence as an 
imperial power in 1884 combined with the willingness of scholars to meet society’s demand for 
a new kind of oriental knowledge.6 My thesis works within the historiography established by 
Suzanne Marchand’s German Orientalism in the Age of Empire by accepting the premise that 
imperialism acted as a catalyst for the modernization of oriental studies. I also accept her 
argument that German unification opened up new possibilities for scholars of the Orient, thereby 
facilitating a Second Oriental Renaissance. It must be noted, however, that Marchand’s analysis 
                                                 
3
 Raymond Schwab, The Oriental Renaissance: Europe’s Rediscovery of India and the East, 1680-1880, 
trans. Gene Patterson-Black and Victor Reinking (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 1.  
4
 Schwab, The Oriental Renaissance, xxiii. 
5
 Marchand, German Orientalism, 157-162. 
6
 Marchand, German Orientalism, 333-348. 
3 
emanates from the vantage point of the longue durée. My thesis, on the other hand, searches for a 
more immediate interpretation and thus represents a more narrowly defined inquiry into the 
intellectual arsenal of the first modern oriental scholars. Scholars of the ancient Orient, for 
example, utilized tools such as biblical criticism, philology, and archeology in order to access 
their subject matter.7 However, when tasked with interpreting the modern world, these tools were 
largely ineffective. The Epic of Gilgamesh offered no greater insight into the workings of 
modern Mesopotamia than the Iliad did into modern Greco-Turkish relations. As is often the 
case, the emergence of new problems requires the development of new tools. The purpose of my 
thesis is to explore the development of the intellectual tools necessary for the study of the 
modern Orient as they developed during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the 
German Empire. 
My thesis advances the argument that the study of history and sociology was instrumental in 
bringing the Orient into the modern world. Central to my study is the work of Carl Heinrich 
Becker (1876-1933), one of the Wilhelmine period’s most eminent orientalists. It is my 
contention that Becker’s comparative analysis of Christianity and Islam, austerely entitled 
Christentum und Islam (1907), represents the first major work of modern oriental studies.8 
Christianity and Islam recounts the parallel historical development of Christianity and Islam as 
complex, yet fundamentally similar, religious systems that only diverge at the point of the 
Renaissance. Moreover, I have selected Christianity and Islam because it was published during 
Becker’s most productive and innovative years as a scholar. In many ways, Becker’s career 
mirrored larger developments in the field of German orientalism. Although Becker quickly 
adopted the modern Orient as his object of study, his training as an orientalist was nearly 
                                                 
7
 Marchand, German Orientalism, 102-105. 
8
 I will hereafter refer to Christentum und Islam as Christianity and Islam because I have chosen to base 
my analysis on H. J. Chaytor’s 1909 English translation of the text. 
4 
identical to his eighteenth and early nineteenth-century counterparts. For instance, he was 
introduced to oriental studies through Old Testament criticism, the field’s traditional point of 
entry, and he studied with several students of Heinrich Leberecht Fleischer, one of the most 
influential philologists of the nineteenth century.9 In 1908, Becker accepted an appointment at 
the Kolonialinstitut in Hamburg, an important training ground for Germany’s colonial and 
overseas administrators.10 While in Hamburg, Becker aggressively advocated the implementation 
of Islamwissenschaft (the scientific study of Islam) on behalf of Germany’s colonial project. 
Becker’s first publication at Hamburg, L'Islam et la Colonisation de l'Afrique (1910), a none-
too-subtle treatise on racial and religious hierarchies in Africa, exemplified his deep commitment 
to Islamwissenschaft. In summation, the publication of Christianity and Islam represented a 
liminal moment in Becker’s academic career when was no longer a traditional orientalist but not 
yet a crude mouthpiece for German colonial ambitions.  
My central argument is that Becker’s Christianity and Islam employed key concepts from 
Religionssoziologie (the sociology of religion), a field pioneered by Max Weber and Émile 
Durkheim, as its methodology of choice for transporting the Orient out of antiquity and into the 
modern world. As such, my thesis represents a comparative analysis of Christianity and Islam, 
on the one hand, and the sociological writings of Weber and Durkheim on the other. There is a 
wealth of historiography that links the work of Durkheim and Weber to the burgeoning field of 
sociology. According to Ken Morrison, the early twentieth-century writings of Weber and 
Durkheim, in addition to Karl Marx’s German Ideology (1845) and Capital (1867, 1885, 1894), 
                                                 
9
 Robert Irwin, Dangerous Knowledge: Orientalism and Its Discontents (New York: Overlook Press, 
2006), 198. 
10
 Nina Berman, German Literature on the Middle East: Discourses and Practices, 1000-1989 (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011), 160.  
5 
constituted the formation of a new body of knowledge known as structural theory.11 Structural 
theory denotes “a family of perspectives in social thought which use specific techniques of 
interpretation for studying history, human nature and society” and derives its name from “the 
tendency to conceptualize society as a structure of social fields which exist outside the 
individual.”12 In this view, the purpose of Weber’s Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism 
(1905) and Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1912) was to delineate the 
influence of a specific social field, i.e. religion, on human behavior and social activity. My thesis 
accepts the position that numerous scholars, including Ken Morrison, have put forth—that the 
works of Karl Marx, Émile Durkheim, and Max Weber constitute a single, coherent thought 
community, or community of discourse. Moreover, it is my contention that Becker’s Christianity 
and Islam represents the confluence of the sociology of religion with traditional oriental studies, 
two previously separate communities of discourse. 
In order to demonstrate the connection between the orientalism of Becker and the 
sociology of religion of Weber and Durkheim, my thesis employs the methodological approach 
advanced by Dominick LaCapra in Rethinking Intellectual History: Texts, Contexts, Language 
(1983). LaCapra’s work represents a fierce rejoinder to Clifford Geertz’s anthropological notion 
of “thick description.” In The Interpretation of Cultures (1973), Geertz interpreted culture as a 
fundamentally semiotic phenomenon.  “Believing with Max Weber, that man is an animal 
suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun,” Geertz understood culture “to be those 
webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an 
                                                 
11
 Ken Morrison, Marx, Durkheim, Weber: Formations of Modern Social Thought, 2nd ed. (Thousand 
Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, 2006), 3-6. 
12
 Morrison, Marx, Durkheim, Weber, 4. 
6 
interpretive one in search of meaning.”13  At the center of Geertz’s semiotic universe is the 
primacy of signs.  Signs allow members of a society to communicate with one another and can 
include language, clothing, and even non-verbal gestures. To understand the signs themselves, 
however, requires a heavy contextualization of the culture in question: “As interworked systems 
of construable signs, culture is not a power, something to which social events, behaviors, 
institutions, or processes can be casually attributed; it is a context, something within which they 
can be intelligibly – that is, thickly – described.”14  The implication for historians is that the 
interpretation of textual evidence ultimately rests with the historians ability to “thickly describe” 
the context in which the text was originally produced. In this view, providing historical context is 
the chief aim of the historian’s craft.  
LaCapra, on the other hand, undermines the wonder-working power of heavy 
contextualization by complicating the relationship between text and context. LaCapra’s argument 
is that  
the special value of [“thick description”] is the insistence upon the way a context 
has its own complex particularity that calls for detailed interpretation—indeed the 
way it may fruitfully be seen on the analogy of the text. Intellectual history shares 
with the disciplines such as literary criticism and the history of philosophy, 
however, an initial focus upon complex written texts and a need to formulate as a 
problem what is often taken, deceptively, as a solution: the relationship between 
texts an their various pertinent contexts.15 
 
According to LaCapra, intellectual historians must problematize the relationship between text 
and context instead of relying on the uncritical assumption that “any given context is the context 
for the adequate interpretation of texts.”16 In the case of Carl Heinrich Becker, there a number of 
                                                 
13
 Clifford Geertz, “Thick Description: Toward an Interpretative Theory of Culture,” in The Interpretation 
of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 5.  
14
 Geertz, “Thick Description,”14. 
15
 Dominick LaCapra, Rethinking Intellectual History: Texts, Contexts, Language (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1983), 16. 
16
 LaCapra, Rethinking Intellectual History, 16. 
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distinct contexts against which his life’s work could potentially be interpreted: late nineteenth-
century oriental studies, German colonialism, Wilhelmine Germany, fin-de-siècle Germany,17 
Weimar Germany (Becker was the Weimar government’s Minister of Sciences, Arts, and Public 
Instruction during the 1920s),18 or in the case of the present study, the sociology of religion. 
According to LaCapra, these various contexts are essentially “interacting contexts whose 
relations to one another are variable and problematic and whose relation to the text being 
investigated raises difficult issues in interpretation.”19 To alleviate these challenges of 
interpretation, LaCapra developed six different frameworks of analysis—the relations of a text to 
“intentions, motivations, society, culture, the corpus, and structure.”20 
Given that the purpose of the present study is to definitively link Becker’s Christianity 
and Islam with the sociology of religion espoused by Durkheim and Weber, my methodological 
approach is largely based on LaCapra’s understanding of the relation of culture to texts. LaCapra 
envisions intellectual history as “a history of intellectuals, of the communities of discourse in 
which they function, and of the varying relations—ranging in often complicated ways from 
insulation to openness—they manifest toward the larger culture.”21 There is certainly sufficient 
reason to believe that works of Durkheim, Weber, and Marx constitute a community of 
intellectuals, and it is therefore reasonable to assume that their work possesses a kind of inter-
textual coherence. My thesis, on the other hand, makes the case that Becker’s Christianity and 
Islam warrants his inclusion into this community of discourse. In fact, Becker and Weber were 
personal acquaintances and colleagues at the University of Heidelberg for several years, and their 
                                                 
17
 Suzanne Marchand and David Lindenfeld, “Germany at the Fin de Siècle: An Introduction,” in 
Germany at the Fin de Siècle: Culture, Politics, and Ideas (Baton Rogue: Louisiana State Press, 2004),  
1-32. 
18
 Irwin, Dangerous Knowledge, 199. 
19
 LaCapra, Rethinking Intellectual History, 35. 
20
 LaCapra, Rethinking Intellectual History, 36. 
21
 LaCapra, Rethinking Intellectual History, 49. 
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professional relationship was most certainly Becker’s introduction to the world of sociology. 
Although first published in 1912, Durkheim’s Elementary Forms of Religious Life was actually 
composed between the years 1902 and 1911, right at the height of both Becker’s and Weber’s 
scholarly power.22 Moreover, it was during the aforementioned period that Durkheim was most 
concerned with similar issues of society and religion, albeit from his academic post at the 
Sorbonne. 
In other words, the present study establishes textual coherence between Becker’s work 
and the work of Durkheim and Weber by affirming the sociology of religion as an adequate 
context for the interpretation of Becker’s most significant text. Although LaCapra endorses a 
“community of discourse” approach to intellectual history, he also insists 
the focus on communities of discourse must be cogently related to the problem of 
textual interpretation. It is not enough to establish influence or the existence of 
shared paradigm through the enumeration of common presuppositions, questions, 
themes, or arguments. One must elucidate in a more detailed way how the 
borrowed or the common actually functions in the texts in question.23 
 
LaCapra’s warning is reminiscent of Quentin Skinner’s notion of the “reification of doctrines.” 
In “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas,” Skinner argued that intellectual 
historians must resist the temptation to “search for approximations of the ideal type” because 
such an approach “yields a form of non-history which is almost entirely given over to point out 
earlier ‘anticipations’ of later doctrines, and in crediting each writer in terms of this 
clairvoyance.”24 As such, the present study avoids the mere cataloging of common influence as 
well as any version of the anticipation of ideas. Instead, my thesis emphasizes “the issue of how 
                                                 
22
 Morrison, Marx, Durkheim, Weber, 231. 
23
 LaCapra, Rethinking Intellectual History, 51. 
24
 Quentin Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas,” History and Theory 8 (1969): 
11. 
9 
common ideas function differentially in different texts.”25 The context of Religionssoziologie in 
the present study is analyzed under the framework established by LaCapra, which is to say that 
context, in general, is conceptualized as a “limited, critical concept in historical research.”26 
On a final note, a brief historiographical overview of Carl Heinrich Becker is in order. 
Although numerous historians have acknowledged Becker as a key figure in the modernization 
of oriental studies, rarely has his work been the subject of an extended literary, sociological, or 
historical analysis. In Weber and Islam (1974), Bryan S. Turner asserted that Max Weber derived 
the majority of his working knowledge of Islamic social structures from the work of Becker, his 
Heidelberg colleague.27 Turner also described Becker and Weber as sharing similar views on the 
differences between European and Islamic feudalism insofar that the latter was defined by an 
unmistakable affinity for prebendalism.28 The most intriguing feature of Turner’s brief treatment 
of Becker, however, was the claim that Becker promoted a mono-causal explanation for “the 
foundation and expansion of Islam” that was based the external influence of “economic 
necessities.”29 Mark Batunsky categorically rejected this claim in “Carl Heinrich Becker: From 
Old to Modern Islamology” when he argued that Becker’s view on the “evolution of the Muslim 
Orient” paid tribute to a multitude of factors—social, intellectual, and ethnic.30 In fact, 
Batunsky’s central argument was that in Becker’s work 
the Muslim and Christian civilizations, considered almost totally separate until 
then, became interrelated and dialectically united, though different in their 
essential contents; they became two “sides” of the same cultural circle. Closed in 
Antiquity and even in the Middle Ages, that circle was “broken” later and in 
                                                 
25
 LaCapra, Rethinking Intellectual History, 51. 
26
 LaCapra, Rethinking Intellectual History, 16. 
27
 Bryan S. Turner, Weber and Islam: A Critical Study (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), 99. 
28
 Turner, Weber and Islam, 127. 
29
 Turner, Weber and Islam, 32. 
30
 Mark Batunsky, “Carl Heinrich Becker: From Old to Modern Islamology. Commemorating the 70th 
Anniversary of ‘Der Islam als Problem,’” International Journal of Middle East Studies Vol. 13, No. 3 
(Aug. 1981), 293. 
10 
modern times, mainly due to the Renaissance and Reformation, but it should close 
again in the future, as its “sides” became dependent on the same fields of gravity 
represented primarily by Hellenism.31 
 
Published in 1981, Batunsky’s essay paid careful attention to the nuances of Becker’s pluralistic 
cultural analysis, and despite its emphasis on Becker’s earlier writings, the article represents one 
of the most detailed and substantial scholarly treatments the German orientalist has received to 
date. However, in light of more recent scholarship, Batunsky’s work suffers from a failure to 
situate Becker within the larger context of German Orientalism. 
After the publication of Batunsky’s article, there was very little of note written about 
Becker until Gottfried Hagen’s “German Heralds of Holy War: Orientalists and Applied Oriental 
Studies.” Published in 2004, Hagen’s essay was primarily concerned with Becker’s advocacy of 
Islamwissenschaft during the years immediately preceding the First World War, although he 
does offer a few key insights about Becker’s academic career. For instance, Hagen argued that 
Becker’s early work “sought to locate Islam as a civilization in a global historical process” while 
his later work emphasized the advantages of “instrumentalizing” Islam for colonial purposes.32 
Hagen’s observations about Becker’s career trajectory are echoed in the scholarship of Nina 
Berman, Robert Irwin, and Suzanne Marchand. Although Becker’s work only receives a brief 
mention in Berman’s German Literature on the Middle East (2011) and Irwin’s Dangerous 
Knowledge (2008), it is clear that both scholars view Becker as a transitional figure, a crucial 
stepping-stone on the path to modern oriental studies. While Marchand share this interpretation 
of Becker’s place in the larger history of German Orientalism, she also manages to significantly 
expand on the scholarship of Batunsky and Hagen by presenting a more comprehensive account 
of Becker’s entire professional life. More specifically, Marchand argues that Becker was never 
                                                 
31
 Batunsky, “Carl Heinrich Becker,” 297. 
32
 Gottfried Hagen, “German Heralds of Holy War: Orientalists and Applied Oriental Studies,” 
Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 24, n. 2 (2004): 148-149. 
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able to successfully balance the objective scholarship of his early academic career with the kind 
of political relevancy that defined his later political career. It is for this reason that Marchand 
described Becker’s legacy as being simultaneously “progressive and reprehensible.”33  
Returning to LaCapra’s conception of a community of discourse, it is clear that Becker’s 
most significant historiographers—Batunsky, Hagen, and Marchand—have primarily interpreted 
his work as a mixture of traditional oriental studies and turn-of-the-century German colonialism. 
My thesis complicates the historiography of C. H. Becker by positing a third community of 
discourse, the burgeoning field of sociology. Although Christianity and Islam, the key text under 
consideration in the present study, certainly fits under the purview of the established orthodoxy, 
my interpretation of the text is that it represents a meditation on the modern world, a world 
defined by both the complexity of its cultural systems as well as its shared historical link to the 
past. The sociology of religion, a concept that preoccupied the period’s most influential thinkers, 
provided Becker with a new methodology for investigating a new Orient. 
Historians seldom mention Christianity and Islam. As such, Chapter Two capitalizes on 
the opportunity to introduce the reader to Becker’s revolutionary text by outlining a few its key 
arguments and ideas. More importantly, this chapter develops a basic framework for 
understanding Becker’s conception of Islamic Kulturgeschichte, and it is for this reason that 
Chapter Two is entitled “Islamic Kulturgeschichte.” 
Chapter Three, entitled “The Sociology of Religion,” expands on Chapter Two by 
comparing Becker’s methodology to the sociology o religion. The purpose of this chapter is to 
identify key elements of sociology within Becker’s Christianity and Islam and firmly situates his 
work within the camp of Max Weber and Émile Durkheim. Durkheim’s Elementary Forms of 
                                                 
33
 Marchand, German Orientalism, 367. 
12 
Religious Life, considered by many to be the definitive classic of the sociology of religion, is the 
key text under consideration.  
Chapter Four, entitled “Culture and the Study of History” examines the more historicist 
and cultural elements of Christianity and Islam.  
Chapter Five functions as the conclusion of the work. This chapter also offers brief 



















2 ISLAMIC KULTURGESCHICHTE 
 
In German Orientalism in the Age of Empire, Suzanne Marchand argues that the scholarly 
work of Carl Heinrich Becker was “instrumental in laying the foundations for a new sort of 
Islamic Kulturgeschichte” and that by “removing both positivistic objectivity and romantic 
origin-seeking from the study of Islamic history,” Becker “made possible a rich means of 
understanding East-West cultural interactions in the ancient and medieval worlds.”34 Nina 
Berman echoes this claim in German Literature on the Middle East when she notes that 
“together with Martin Hartmann (1851-1918), and in spite of significant differences in outlook, 
Becker changed the field of German Oriental studies, making the contemporary Middle East a 
worthy object of study for the first time.”35 Indeed, if Hartmann’s Islamische Orient, the first 
installments of which were published in 1899, represented the call to arms on behalf of the 
modern Orient, then Becker’s Christianity and Islam (1907) and his formulation of Islamic 
Kulturgeschichte (cultural history) was most certainly its greatest champion. As a result of their 
innovative scholarship, “the applicability of scholarly knowledge [about the modern Orient] 
became a point of discussion” in Wilhelmine Germany.36 
From the Reformation to the mid-nineteenth century, German orientalism favored “Central 
European religious and political affairs, university building, classical philology, and Old 
Testament criticism” over imperial envy.37 Indeed, the early colonial ambitions of the British, 
French, and Dutch—defined by “cross-oceanic commerce and colonization”—were almost 
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 Marchand, German Orientalism, 366. 
35
 Berman, German Literature on the Middle East, 160. 
36
 Berman, German Literature on the Middle East, 160. 
37
 Marchand, German Orientalism, 28. 
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entirely alien to the Germans.38 It was instead an unstable border with the Ottoman Empire that 
defined Germany’s relationship to the non-European world. As such, the decline of Ottoman 
power over the course of the eighteenth century opened up new avenues of inquiry for scholars 
of the Orient, and by the mid-nineteenth century, the profession was undergoing a handful of 
quiet innovations.39 However, it was only during the late nineteenth, i.e. Second Oriental 
Renaissance, that the “applicability of scholarly knowledge” became a prerequisite for 
conceptualizing the Orient. The earliest work of Carl Heinrich Becker, such as his dissertation on 
the writings of Abu'l-Faraj ibn al-Jawzi, attests to his keen interest in the history of the post-
Hellenic Orient, but his philological methodology remained firmly rooted in the past.40  
 The purpose of this chapter is to outline some of Becker’s main points from Christianity 
and Islam in greater detail. In particular, this chapter develops a rudimentary framework for 
interpreting Becker’s understanding of Islamic Kulturgeschichte (cultural history) as well as his 
views on the nature of modernity. Christianity and Islam is relatively unknown to scholars of 
orientalism, and it is certainly unheard of amongst historians of sociology. As such, it is worth 
exploring a few basic elements of the text before juxtaposing it against the exceedingly well-
known works of Max Weber and Émile Durkheim. It is my contention that it was not until the 
publication of Christianity and Islam in 1907 that the history of the ancient Orient was brought 
fully into the modern world. Becker’s scholarship traced the historical and sociological 
development of both religions from the original teachings of Jesus and Muhammad through the 
Middle Ages and into the early modern period. Becker’s main line of argument was that 
medieval Islam borrowed ideas from early Christianity so extensively that Christianity’s later 
adoption of those same ideas during the period preceding the Renaissance was not only 
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 Marchand, German Orientalism, 28. 
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 Marchand, German Orientalism, 103. 
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 Marchand, German Orientalism, 361-362. 
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metaphysically straightforward but also completely natural. In fact, Becker viewed both 
Christianity and Islam as joint heirs to a glorious Hellenic past. 
 The opening pages of Christianity and Islam are dedicated to outlining Becker’s research 
paradigm. As such, Becker’s first order of business was to disentangle oriental studies from 
Christian theology. In Becker’s time, it was still popular for orientalist scholars to view the study 
of Islam as a method of improving the proselytizing techniques of missionaries or securing 
“scientific proof” of Christianity’s superiority.41 Becker, on the other hand, was interested in 
approaching Islam from a decidedly “historical perspective” in order to obtain a “clear view of 
the influence which Christianity has exerted upon other religions or has itself received from 
them.”42 Furthermore, Becker defended the comparative approach toward the analogous 
development of Christianity and Islam on the grounds that 
a world-religion, such as Christianity, is a highly complex structure and the 
evolution of such a system of belief is best understood by examining a religion to 
which we have not been bound by a thousand ties from the earliest days of our 
lives. If we take an alien religion as our subject of investigation, we shall not 
shrink from the consequences of the historical method: whereas, when we 
criticize Christianity, we are often unable to see the falsity of pre-suppositions 
which we necessarily bring to the task of inquiry: our minds follow the doctrines 
of Christianity, even as our bodies perform their functions – in complete 
unconsciousness.43  
 
Chapter Three will examine the evolutionary aspects of Becker’s methodology in greater depth, 
but what Becker was essentially calling for was a more self-conscious and objective approach to 
history. In his study, Christianity functions as a familiar point of reference. Becker used it to 
break down misconceptions, to make foreign ideas more relatable, and ultimately, to make the 
“alien religion” of Islam a little less alien. His treatment of Islam, on the other hand, was 
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designed to serve as the template for exactly the sort of sober and cool-headed historical 
methodology and analysis required to study all religions, Christianity included.  
 Becker’s understanding of world religions as “highly complex structures” was integral to 
his conception of Islamic Kulturgeschichte. According to Becker, it was self-evident that the 
structures of both Christianity and Islam had changed over time, but in his view, these changes 
were chiefly influenced by culture. Take, for instance, Becker’s treatment of the Quran as an 
historical document: 
Muhammad had an indefinite idea of the word of God as known to him from 
other religions. He was unable to realize this idea effectively except as an 
immediate revelation; hence throughout the Quran he represents God as speaking 
in the first person and himself appears as the interlocutor...[as such,] it was of 
primary importance that the Quran should be regard as God's word and not as 
man's. This fact largely contributed to the secure and uncontaminated 
transmission of the text, which seems also to have been left by Muhammad 
himself in definite form.44 
 
Becker’s argument that the preservation of the Quran in unaltered form stemmed from the belief 
that Muhammad served as a direct mediator between God and man was hardly original. What is 
novel about Becker’s approach, however, was that he viewed this phenomenon through an 
historical lens. If approached from the perspective of a theologian, as was customary at the turn 
of the twentieth century, the question of the Quran’s divinity would most likely be framed in 
terms of its veracity. From the point of view of a Christian theologian, the answer to this 
particular question was almost certainly a forgone conclusion. Becker, on the other hand, was 
primarily concerned with how religious beliefs, regardless of their truth-value, influenced social 
activity. In Becker’s view, the act of preserving a holy text in its original form for over a 
millennium certainly constituted a social activity, if not a full-scale social institution. The 
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implication for Becker, a historian of Islam, was that the Quran represented a reliable historical 
document penned by the founder of the religion himself. 
 In On Heroes, Hero-worship, and the Heroic in History (1840), the Scottish historian 
Thomas Carlyle famously declared that “the history of the world is but the biography of great 
men.”45 Carlyle envisioned history as a celebration of great men—leaders, creators, and 
innovators of the highest order. Great men, in short, were nothing less than heroes, and these 
heroes most often took the form of prophets, poets, priests, men of letters, and kings. 
Interestingly, the only prophet included in Carlyle’s study was Muhammad: “We have chosen 
Mahomet (Muhammad) not as the most eminent Prophet; but as the one we are freest to speak 
of.”46 As previously noted by Marchand, the mid-nineteenth century witnessed quiet innovations 
in the field of oriental studies, and among the greatest of these innovations was the re-imaging of 
Muhammad as a legitimate prophet. Carlyle, for instance, conceded that while Muhammad was 
“by no means the truest of Prophets,” he was most certainly a “true one” and that “our current 
hypothesis about Mahomet, that he was a scheming Imposter, a Falsehood incarnate, that his 
religion is a mere mass of quackery and fatuity, begins really to be now untenable to any one.”47 
In light of shifting attitudes about the legitimacy of Muhammad’s status as a prophet, Carlyle 
experienced a level of academic freedom not previously known to scholars of the Orient. It is 
partly for this reason that he considered Muhammad to be the prophet he was “freest to speak 
of.” It also helped Carlyle’s case that Muhammad was considered a prophet outside of the Judeo-
Christian tradition, and therefore there was much less at stake in re-defining his legacy. 
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 Carlyle’s On Heroes represented one of the earliest formulations of the Great Man theory 
of history, and there exists a degree to which Becker’s Christianity and Islam fits within this 
tradition. The key difference between Carlyle and Becker, however, was that Becker interpreted 
the Quran as an historical document instead of a holy book. In other words, Becker viewed the 
Quran as the product of a single man, albeit a holy man, and therefore interpreted the text as a 
window into the “workings of [Muhammad’s] mind.”48 The majority of Christianity and Islam 
was devoted to enumerating Christianity’s numerous influences on the early development of 
Islam, and one of Becker’s main lines of argument was that Muhammad exercised a great deal of 
creative control over nascent Islam. According to Becker, Muhammad regarded Islam as a “faith 
rather of experience than of theory or dogma” while simultaneously envisioning Christianity as 
representative of “all pre-existing intellectual culture.”49 As such, the influence of Judaism and 
other regional religions was folded into the cultural current of Christianity, and their combined 
influence on Islam was mediated almost exclusively through a single individual. In Becker’s 
view, the rapid proliferation of Islam—especially in regions of the world that would later 
become sites of German colonial interest—attested to the sheer scale of Muhammad’s individual 
influence on world affairs.  
 Although Becker agreed with Carlyle that Muhammad was neither huckster nor heretic, 
he maintained that Muhammad’s knowledge of Christianity was completely fragmented and  
consist[ed] of certain isolated details, partly apocryphal, partly canonical, together 
with a hazy idea of the fundamental dogmas. Thus the influence of Christianity 
upon [Muhammad] was entirely indirect. The Muhammedan movement at its 
outset was influenced not by the real Christianity of the time but by Christianity 
which Muhammad criticized in certain details and forced into harmony with his 
preconceived ideas.50 
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According to Becker, much of Islam’s individual character was determined by Muhammad’s 
misinterpretation of Christian theology. As evidence of Muhammad’s misinterpretation, Becker 
cites Muhammad’s belief that the crucifixion of Jesus Christ was a “malicious invention of the 
Jews, who in reality crucified some other sufferer while Jesus entered the divine glory.”51 In 
Becker’s view, not only did Muhammad’s rejection of the crucifixion signal that had “no idea of 
the importance of the Crucifixion the Christian Church” but that he also lacked any real 
understanding of the Old and New Testament.52 As such, Becker considered it second nature for 
Muhammad to habitually prioritize his own preconceived notions over fragments of Jewish and 
Christian ideas. As further evidence of this phenomenon, Becker pointed to Muhammad’s 
interpretation of Abraham. After experiencing resistance from the Jewish residents of Medina, 
Muhammad shifted his message from the teachings of Moses and Jesus to Abraham, whom “he 
was more than ever inclined to regard as his special forerunner.”53 Becker also argued that 
Muhammad linked Abraham with “ancient Meccan Ka’ba worship,” a sacred site to both ancient 
Arabs and contemporary Muslims. “Thus,” Becker added, “Islam gradually assumed the form of 
an Arab religion, developing universalist tendencies in the ultimate course of events.”54 In this 
view, the Arab-centric orientation of Islam stemmed directly from Muhammad’s individual and 
idiosyncratic interpretation of Abraham. As such, Becker has presented an explanation of a 
sociological phenomenon—the supremacy of Arabs in the Islamic Orient—in terms of historical 
and cultural development, i.e. the absorption of an ancient, ethnically coded practice into a new 
religious tradition. Moreover, the sociological and cultural dimensions of this historical process 
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were preserved in the text of Quran, generally unaltered over time due to Muhammad’s own 
belief about the nature of his work. 
 An additional point of contact between Christianity and Islam was the development of 
similar moral systems. According to Becker, morality in both Christian and Islamic theology 
during the Middle Ages was predicated on a critical distance between God and man. In many 
ways, the present life was merely a brief prelude to a far richer afterlife. According to Becker, 
medieval Christian morality most often assumed the form of the Imitation of the Master, an 
“attempt to repeat [Christ’s] poverty and reunification of personal property.”55 Muhammad, by 
contrast, “was neither poor nor without possessions: at the end of his life he had become a prince 
and had directly stated that property was a gift from god.” In Becker’s view, the adherence of 
Muslims to the Sunnah—a set of teachings and practices traditionally attributed to Muhammad—
represented a misguided attempt at replicating the moral code of the Imitation of Christ. Becker’s 
argument was that by conflating Muhammad’s position in Islam with the centrality of Christ’s 
Incarnation in the Christian tradition, Muslims only succeeded in replicating the most mundane 
and trivial aspects of Muhammad’s life. Furthermore, the purpose of Becker’s Kulturgeschichte 
was to identify the historical emergence of cultural practices, especially practices that were at 
odds with the intellectual traditions from which they emerged. In Becker’s view, there was 
nothing inherent to Islam that recommended the Imitation of the Master as moral code, thus 
demonstrating the external influence of Christianity on early Islamic practices.  
The influence of Islam on Christianity, on the other hand, occupied a much smaller 
section of Christianity and Islam. It is highly significant that Becker only mentioned a few 
specific instances of Christianity adopting ideas from Islam, chief among them “commercial 
products of the East” as well as “important economic methods, the ideals of our so-called 
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European chivalry and of its love poetry, the foundations of our natural sciences, even 
theological and philosophical ideas of high value were then set to us from the East.56 Instead, 
Becker conceived of the relationship between Christianity and Islam as dialectical in nature, and 
he framed the question of Islamic influence in terms of understanding how Christian Europe 
eclipsed the Islamic Orient after the sixteenth century. In other words, Becker was most heavily 
concerned with how Christianity assumed the role of senior partner in a post-Hellenic dialectic. 
The short answer was that “the source of both religions [laid] in the East and in Oriental 
thought.”57 According to Becker, Islam incorporated the intellectual tradition of Christianity with 
great flexibility because of the origin of both traditions was firmly rooted in the Orient: “the 
rising power of Islam, which had high faculties of self-accommodation to environment, was able 
to enter upon the heritage of the mixed Greco-Oriental civilization existing in the East.”58 As a 
consequence of Islam’s penchant for seamless adaptation,  “it gained an immediate advantage 
over the West, where Eastern ideas were acclimatized with difficulty.” Becker envisioned Islam 
as a rejuvenating power in the Orient, and he identified centuries of Islamic proliferation as a 
period of great cultural flourishing. As such, Becker noted that it was only in recent history that 
Islamic cultural development stalled and that Christian Europe rose to take the Orient’s place.  
In many ways, the text represents Becker’s attempt at explaining the Great Divergence, 
i.e. the considerable economic gulf between Europe and the rest of the world.59 According to 
Becker, it was the Renaissance that “[liberated] the West from the chains of Greek ecclesiastical 
classicism, from Oriental metaphysical religion, and slowly [paved] the way for the introduction 
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of Germanic ideals directly derived from true classicism. Not until the [Renaissance did] the 
West burst the bonds in which Orientalism had confined it.”60 There are a number of key points 
to draw out from this passage. First, there’s a definite sense in which Becker viewed modernity 
as a break from the past. For instance, Becker described Europe’s relationship with the greater 
Mediterranean world—in the form of both Greek and Oriental influences—as a form of bondage 
that was not broken until the Renaissance. Becker’s high praise of “Germanic ideals,” on the 
other hand, certainly reflected Wilhelmine Germany’s rising star in the constellation of European 
powers, but there’s also the sense in which the derivation of those ideals from “true classicism” 
implies a strong link to the past. As such, it is my contention that Becker’s conception of 
modernity was fundamentally historical in nature. Modernity represented progress, a major step 
in the linear progression of time. Although were a handful of exceptions—thinkers like Friedrich 
Nietzsche and Oswald Spengler come to mind—the mood in Germany during the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries was generally optimistic, so it is not entirely surprising that Becker 
situated the rise of Germany within a larger historical narrative of European emancipation. In 
this regard, the modernism of German Orientalism was diametrically opposed to the modernism 
that defined fin-de-siècle Vienna. 
[INCOMPLETE] 
In Fin-De-Siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture (1980), Carl Schorske argued that in the 
face of intensified ossification of both political and social structures, the citizens of late-
nineteenth-century Vienna retreated to the interior—the political gave way to the psychological. 
In a society where there existed no prescriptions for treating political malaise, Sigmund Freud 
instead turned to a theory of man and society rooted in neither history nor tradition. In The 
Interpretation of Dreams (1900), Freud outlined 
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Psychoanalysis, then, represents not only a retreat from the past but also from all manner 
of  political engagement.the unconscious and to the interpretation of dreams to understand the 
root cause of human suffering  
 
"In the following pages, I shall demonstrate that there exists a psychological technique by 
which dreams may be interpreted and that upon the application of this method every dream will 
show itself to be a senseful psychological structure which may be introduced into an assignable 
place in the psychic activity of the waking state.” 
 
[Elaborate here.] Artists like Gustav Klimt, on the other hand, created intensely personal 
and self-reflective works. According to Schorske, the culture of the fin de siècle was defined by 
the desire to not only subvert the historical but to transcend it entirely. Modernity in Vienna, with 
its emphasis on the psychological, was rooted in an attempt to move beyond history during a 
time in which political and social institutions remained immovable.  
My argument, on the other hand, is that German scholars of the Orient moved in the 
opposite direction of their Viennese counter-parts. Instead of breaking free from the chains of 
history, they actively sought to impose history onto a traditionally ahistorical entity, i.e. the 
Orient. [Add more about Schorske’s view on liberalism vs Eley/Blackbourn liberalism] 
 
[Ignore rest of chapter] 
Second, Becker views the  
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In a similar vain to Karl Marx’s conception of the Asiastic Mode of Production, a connection 





terpreted the shift from the ancient to modern Orient as an extension of Germany’s entry into the 
colonial race in 1884. Moreover, Marchand has argued that this unprecedented shift of scholarly 
emphasis was made possible, at least in part, by significant changes in the structure of German 
universities and patronage practices brought about by unification in 1871.61 
Carl H. Becker’s Christianity and Islam represents the culmination of all these changes in 
Germa sociery. 
By emphasizing the modern Middle East over the ancient Orient, Christianity and Islam 
represented a radical departure from  
fundamental rupture in the history of oriental studies. Becker’s emphasis on adhering to a strict 
historical methodology is certainly key in modernizing oriental studies. However, Becker’s  
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3 THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION 
 
The connection between the political interests of the German Empire and the scholarly 
research of the academy has been thoroughly explored. The purpose of this chapter is to expand 
on this historiography by analyzing the precise method through which Carl H. Becker was able to 
challenge the deepest convictions of oriental scholarship and transform the modern Orient into a 
“worthy object of study.” As such, this chapter will demonstrate that Becker adopted the 
sociology of religion—a concept pioneered by two of the twentieth century’s greatest social 
theorists, Max Weber (1864-1920) and Émile Durkheim (1858-1917)—as his methodology of 
choice.62 The cultural and intellectual legacies of Weber and Durkheim are closely associated 
with the fin de siècle, but historians have primarily treated Becker as a traditional orientalist and 
a colonial figure. By connecting Becker’s work to the burgeoning field of sociology, this chapter 
will establish Becker as a key participant in a larger debate about the applicability of sociological 
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and cultural analysis in understanding the origins of the modern capitalist system as well as the 
historical development of world religions. More specifically, it is my contention that Becker’s 
Christianity and Islam bridged the gap between traditional oriental studies and cutting-edge 
social science, thus facilitating an unprecedented cross-pollination of ideas between two 
previously separate communities of discourse.  
As previously noted in Chapter Two, Nina Berman was correct to point out Martin 
Hartmann’s role in shifting the attention of oriental studies from the ancient to modern world, but 
his primary contribution to the field was inspiring a young Carl Becker to abandon traditional 
philology in favor of modern Islamic Kulturgeschichte. Hartmann, for instance, was in many 
ways too peripheral a figure to be taken seriously by the academic establishment. Hugo Winckler 
(1863-1913), a German archeologist most famous for discovering the ancient capital of the 
Hittite Empire in Boğazkale, Turkey, described him as a “white raven” because unlike other 
philologists, he was most at home with “the real-existing Orient [instead of] grammatical 
treatises.”63 Hartmann’s The Arabic Press of Egypt (1899), originally published in English 
instead of German, testified to his keen interest in modern developments. Later in his career, 
Becker referred to Hartmann as “a wild weed in the so well-ordered and properly-trimmed 
French garden of the Fleischer school.”64 Perhaps Hartmann’s status as a marginal figure was 
partly to blame for the failure of his research paradigm to gain wide acceptance, but there was 
also a sense in which Hartmann’s work lacked scholarly objectivity—Marchand describes his 
work as possessing “deep prejudices”—and intellectual rigor.65 What Becker brought to the 
table, on the other hand, was both a prestigious academic pedigree and a rigorous methodology. 
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Becker was initially trained as a philologist under the guidance of Heinrich Leberecht Fleischer 
(1801-1888), who himself was trained by the great Antoine Isaac Silvestre de Sacy (1758-1838). 
Given his excellent pedigree, ever so important for an aspiring academic, as well as the fact that 
he would later become the first director of the Kolonialinstitut in Hamburg in 1908, it should 
come as no surprise that Becker was one of the most eminent orientalists working in Germany at 
the turn of the twentieth century. But reputation alone does not a legacy make. The most 
significant difference between the scholarship of Hartmann and Becker was that the latter 
adopted a cutting-edge methodology, i.e. the sociology of religion, which infused his work with 
greater intellectual rigor, won it wider academic relevancy, and eventually secured its political 
notoriety.  
Although Becker’s work was arguably more historical than sociological, Christianity and 
Islam shares much in common with the sociology of religion espoused by both Weber and 
Durkheim. These sociological affinities can be partly explained by Becker’s professional 
relationship with Weber. Becker was part of an intellectual circle at the University of Heidelberg 
that included Max Weber, Ernst Troeltsch (1851-1923), Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915), and 
Eberhard Gothein (1853-1923). According to Suzanne Marchand, Becker’s understanding of 
Islamic history was deeply influenced by this coterie of academics and their “intense world, 
where neo-Kantian philosophy met sociology of religion and where evolutionary and materialist 
development was being rigorously tested against the findings of historicist-philological 
scholarship.”66 Alexander Haridi also explores the Becker-Weber connection—in addition to 
other historiographical considerations, such as Troeltsch’s concept of Kulturkreis (cultural circle) 
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and historicism—in the second part of his M.A. thesis on the subject.67 Although Weber 
certainly exhibited a greater influence on Becker than vice versa, it would seem that Becker, to 
his credit, made an impression on Weber when it came to his writings on Islam. In Weber and 
Islam, Bryan S. Turner argued that Weber derived the majority of his working knowledge of 
Islamic social structures from the work of his colleague.68 Given the multiple points of 
connection between both their lives and their work, there is sufficient reason to believe that 
Becker was well immersed in the sociological literature of the time.  
Weber published numerous essays on the sociology of religion, none more famous than 
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1905). Weber’s argument was that the rise of 
capitalism in Western Europe was intimately linked with “the Calvinist belief in the moral value 
of hard work and fulfillment of one’s worldly duties.”69 In other words, Weber was exploring the 
influence of cultural ideas on human actions and the subsequent impact of those actions on the 
development of social structures and modes of economic activity. In similar fashion, Durkheim 
utilized the sociology of religion in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1912) as a means of 
demonstrating the inherently social nature of all religious beliefs and practices. He argued that 
the foundation of religion rests on the domain of the sacred, but instead of describing the innate 
properties of the world, the concept of the sacred merely imposes itself onto the world as a 
cognitive category, thus putting it within reach of the social scientist. In Durkheim’s view, 
religion “first enables the group to recognize itself as a group, and thereafter the universe 
becomes a spiritualized extension of the group, whose meaning pertains to the group and 
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supports its sense of identity and unity.”70 As such, religion represents the webs of significance 
through which individuals must negotiate their relationship to one another as well as to society 
writ large. Religion is, in Durkheim’s estimation, no more than society worshipping itself.  
Although Becker was originally a Semiticist and Assyriologist, he later came to 
specialize in the history of Islam. The overarching goal of his scholarship was to “normalize” 
Islam, to make it intelligible, to bring it into world history. Islam was perceived in the nineteenth 
century as a monolithic system that bundled race, religion, and culture into a single timeless, 
decadent, and tangled mess. Becker and his cohort were the first generation of oriental scholars 
to challenge both the orthodoxy of a timeless Orient as well as the largely uncontested cultural 
and ontological standing of Christianity. In the closing pages of Christianity and Islam, Becker 
noted the waning influence of religion in twentieth-century Europe: 
 
If I correctly interpret the signs of the times, a retrograde movement in religious 
development has now begun. The religion inspiring a single personality has 
secured domination over the whole of life: family, society, and state have bowed 
beneath its power. Then the reaction begins: slowly religion loses its 
comprehensive force and as its history is learned, even at the price of sorrow, it 
slowly recedes within the true limits of its operation, the individual, the 
personality, in which it is naturally rooted.71 
 
In Becker’s view, the study of history was directly linked to diminishing power of religion in 
every day life, and by introducing the historical method to oriental studies, Becker was 
essentially undermining the good standing of Christian apologetics as a legitimate mode of 
thought. Becker also noted that the religious atrophy produced a distinct feeling of “sorrow,” an 
observation that spoke to the fin de siècle’s crisis of faith. As such, it should be noted that 
Becker’s challenge to time-honored traditions and institutions was not fundamentally different 
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than what Georg Simmel (1858-1918) was demonstrating with money or what Sigmund Freud 
(1856-1939) had in mind with this work on human consciousness.  
In The Philosophy of Money (1900,) for example, Simmel traced the historical 
development of money from the earliest barter systems to the early twentieth-century monetary 
system. The direct trade of goods was the chief characteristic of economic activity during the 
most primitive stages of human development, but as the complexity of these societies increased 
over time, they eventually adopted specific forms of currency. In most cases, this currency either 
reflected the most important good in that particular society—such as bronze coinage in the 
coastal city of Olbia—or adhered to the medieval mentality of “much gets more” by producing 
physically large paper and metal currency. The principle of “much gets more” was also the 
driving force behind the accumulation of precious metals in the mercantilist system of early 
modern Europe. In turn, the accumulation of currency stimulated industry and trade, thereby 
initiating the first major step in money’s transformation from substance to symbol.  Instead of 
viewing money as a direct relationship between two quantities, money was now valued in 
relation to a third quantity: labor.  Simmel’s central argument was that society’s increasingly 
symbolic understanding of money closely mirrored its level of intellectual and cultural 
development. The evolution of money from substance to symbol, then, can be understood as “a 
fundamental re-orientation of culture towards intellectuality.”72 Simmel expanded on this idea by 
demonstrating the rationalizing and democratizing power of symbolic money in contemporary 
society, and he concluded his work by assigning money an integral role in Europe’s cultural shift 
from an absolute to relative understanding of existence. The underlying assumption of Simmel’s 
work was that societies progress from lower to higher forms of organization, and it was this 
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evolutionary understanding of social structures that united Simmel’s project with the work of the 
fin de siècle’s most celebrated intellectuals: Durkheim, Freud, Marcel Mauss (1872-1950), 
Weber, and others. The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that Becker’s Christianity and 
Islam employed an evolutionary understanding of historical development—especially in regard 
to religion, culture, and society—that expressed deep affinities with communities of discourse 
other than turn of the century German orientalism.  
In Christianity and Islam, Becker developed a methodology that relied on the concept of 
religious forms. He argued that Christianity and Islam represented highly complex forms of 
religious life, and the majority of his study was dedicated to demonstrating Islam’s evolution 
from a simple form to a complex structure. According to Becker, Islam in its original form was 
“merely a recognition of Arab supremacy, of the unity of God and of Muhammad’s prophetic 
mission.”73 But, as Becker continues:  
In a few centuries Islam became a complex religious structure, a confusion of 
Greek philosophy and Roman law, accurately regulating every department of 
human life from the deepest problems of morality to the daily use of the 
toothpick, and the fashions of dress and hair. This change from the simplicity of 
the founder’s religious teaching to a system of practical morality often wholly 
divergent from primitive doctrine, is a transformation which all the great religions 
of the world have undergone.74 
 
Becker was a believer in the a priori existence of religious feeling, and he thought that the 
founders of the great religions—Jesus of Nazareth, Muhammad, the Buddha—were able to 
successfully inspire the feelings of true religion in the human heart. Religious systems, or what 
we might call organized religion, resulted from the interaction of genuine religious feeling with 
the “pre-existing capacities of civilization.”75 In other words, our quest for higher understanding 
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is always limited by the time and place in which we exist, by our need to secure resources, and 
by our desire to die another day. 
In regard to the a priori existence of religious feeling, Becker was not as radical a thinker 
as Durkheim. Although Becker undermined traditional notions of religious feeling by including 
religions other than Christianity, he never challenged the divinity of the individual experience. 
He left sufficient room in his account for European Christians to dismiss other religions as 
inappropriate structures that misinterpreted a truly legitimate and unabashedly divine experience. 
Durkheim, on the other hand, argued that religious feeling, although very much real, was actually 
a sociological phenomenon. In The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1912), Durkheim 
argued that the totem was “both the symbol of god and of society” and that god and society were 
therefore “one and the same.”76 Durkheim, along with Weber, believed that human beings are 
social animals that are often, if not always, unaware of the webs of significance in which they are 
ensnared. Durkheim also believed it was the task of social scientists to disentangle those webs. 
The most complex of these cultural webs was, of course, religion. At several points in the text, 
he makes clear that religion would not have survived if it were nothing more than a “system of 
misleading fictions.”77 While Becker merely assumed the authenticity of religious feeling in the 
traditional sense, Durkheim actively demonstrated that such feelings derived from our inherently 
gregarious tendencies, our primordial connection to the clan. Religion, for Durkheim, was a 
social experience, not a spiritual one. 
A second fruitful comparison between the two thinkers was their understanding of 
religious forms. In Christianity and Islam, Becker conceived of Christianity, Islam, and 
Buddhism as complex religious structures emanating from the same fundamental experience of 
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“true religion.” Contemporary religion, for Becker, was comparable to a game of telephone 
where the original message was distorted every time it was whispered in the ear of the next 
person in line.78 Each new layer of religious complexity altered the meaning of the original 
message: 
The object of all this investigation is, in my opinion, one only: to discover how 
the religious experience of the founder of a faith accommodates itself to pre-
existing civilization, in the effort to make its influence operative. The eventual 
triumph of the new religion is in every case and at every time nothing more than a 
compromise: nor can more be expected, inasmuch as the religious instinct, though 
one of the most important influences in man, is not the sole determining influence 
upon his nature.79 
 
In Becker’s view, a nascent religious movement could only survive if it was able to effectively 
accommodate itself to society, but cultural accommodation also implied compromising certain 
key elements of the original message. It was therefore the case that the success of the major 
world religions—measured in terms of both temporal longevity and geographical scope—was 
contingent upon their unique ability to accommodate the values of various cultures and societies 
from one time period to the next and “to make [their] influence operative.” For Becker, what the 
world religions had in common was that they evolved from simple forms, i.e. the original 
teachings of a single individual, to complex structures that possessed distinct political, cultural, 
and even economic dimensions. It was in this sense that Becker’s view of religious forms was 
decidedly evolutionary. In fact, Becker’s argument about the complexity of religious systems in 
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highly complex societies was reminiscent of Simmel’s observations about the development of 
complex monetary systems in advanced civilizations.  
It is also important to note that Becker only extended the authenticity of religious feeling 
to the three aforementioned religions. He had nothing to contribute on the subject of magic or on 
the so-called primitive religions. Durkheim, on the other hand, considered the “lesser religions” 
as being “no less worthy that others.”80 The reason that Durkheim held all religions equal was 
because he believed that all forms of religious practice were manifestations of the exact same 
phenomenon: totemism. Religion, according to Durkheim, was always the “collective 
represented in symbolic form.”81 In other words, the totem embodied society, and if society, or 
the collective, became increasingly complex, so too did the totemic principle. Whereas Becker 
believed that there was something genuinely troubling about the current complexity of religious 
forms, Durkheim considered the emergence of religious complexity as the product of a natural 
and scientific process, not at all different from how a plant develops from a seed or a chicken 
from an egg. It was for this reason that Durkheim believed that an analysis of the most 
elementary form of religious life—Aboriginal Australian totemism—constituted “one well-made 
experiment” that could shed new light on the most universal elements of religion.82  
A Durkheim-inspired comparative history of Christianity and Islam would most certainly 
focus on the individual totems of each religion. In Becker’s view, however, Christianity and 
Islam were cut from the same Hellenic cloth. To be more precise, Christianity was complicated 
by the Greco-Oriental culture of later Hellenism, and Islam, in turn, was influenced by what 
Becker called Christian Oriental Hellenism. In his later work on the subject, particularly Der 
Islam im Rahmen einer allgemeinen Kulturgeschichte (1922) and Das Erbe der Antike im Orient 
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und Okzident (1931), Becker asserted that “Muslim civilization [was] one of the chief heirs of 
the cultural legacy of antiquity.”83 It was Becker, after all, who famously remarked that “ohne 
Alexander den Großen, keine islamische Zivilisation!”84 
Becker’s Christianity and Islam represented the integration of Islam into world history. 
More specifically, he was attempting to demonstrate how Christianity and Islam emerged from 
the same Mediterranean culture. However, the assertion that Christianity and Islam shared a 
common heritage was highly problematic in a society that consistently weighed the moral and 
scientific progress of European Christendom against the perception of a stagnant Orient. In 
response to this conundrum, Becker defined religion as a function of culture. While other 
scholars maintained that the religious teachings of Islam were the primary mover of men in the 
Orient, Becker had something else in mind: “Die Religion blüht und gedeiht auf dem Boden, den 
andere Mächte gedüngt und vorbereitet haben.”85 More importantly, however, Becker argued 
that it was the Renaissance that divided the West from the East. The Renaissance marked the 
point in history where Christianity became modern and Islam remained medieval. A second 
failing of Islam was that it was unable to fully incorporate the Christian Oriental Hellenism that 
came before it. One of the shining achievements of modern Christianity, according to Becker, 
was that it absorbed the greatest virtues of Greek and even Oriental culture without 
fundamentally altering its identity.  
Becker’s interpretation of the Renaissance in Western culture echoed the findings of his 
colleague Max Weber. In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1905), Weber 
                                                 
83
 Irwin, Dangerous Knowledge, 198. 
84
 The origin of this quote is unclear, but it is routinely associated with Becker. Irwin, for instance, 
attributes it to Albert Hourani’s “Islam and the Philosophers of History” (1980). 
85
 Quoted in Mark Batunsky, “Carl Heinrich Becker: From Old to Modern Islamology. Commemorating 
the 70th Anniversary of ‘Der Islam als Problem,’” International Journal of Middle East Studies Vol. 13, 
No. 3 (Aug. 1981), 292. 
36 
rejected Marxist historical materialism in favor of cultural explanations that identified religion, 
among other things, as the engine of historical change. His central argument was that the rise of 
the modern capitalist system was contingent upon the widespread acceptance of Calvinist values. 
According to Calvinist doctrine, there could be no salvation through faith. Long before the 
creation of man, God had already preordained which souls to save and which souls to condemn. 
There was no way of knowing for certain if an individual was one of God’s predestined elect, but 
it was believed that an individual’s economic and social circumstances might offer a key 
indication. 
In keeping with the fin de siècle mentalité, Weber placed a heavy emphasis on the intense 
anxiety that such a religious teaching would create. Calvinists lived in constant fear that they 
were not one of the elect, so they did everything in their power to ensure, at least in their own 
minds, that they were worthy of God’s grace. The most conspicuous site of Calvinist piety was 
the workplace. Calvinists believed that one’s work was a holy vocation. To work well was to 
worship well. They also believed that professional success was an indication of God’s grace, and 
to be frivolous with one’s earnings was to insult what God had so generously given them. 
Calvinists, by and large, did not donate large sums of money to their church, which left them 
with the option to either save or invest. Given that Calvinists must constantly work and never 
spend, it was no small wonder, at least according to Weber, that Calvinists were the first group of 
people to accumulate large amounts of capital. 
The common thread linking the works of Becker and Weber was that they both used 
religion and culture as a means of understanding the Great Divergence. According to Mary 
Fulbrook, “the encyclopedic works of Max Weber represented an extraordinary attempt to 
explore and explain the uniquely dynamic paths of Western history, in comparison with patterns 
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of society and culture in other areas of the world.”86 Both Becker and Weber, born in 1876 and 
1864, respectively, were part of a generation of scholars that was trying to find new ways of 
understanding both the world and Europe’s place in it. They both considered culture the primary 
engine of historical change, and their work was ultimately situated between “scientific positivism 
and a more historicist idealism.”87 Although they both rejected the dialectical thinking of 
Marxism, they effectively demonstrated that men do indeed make their own history, albeit not as 
they please. Culture is the limiting factor, often in the form of religion, but they still managed to 
allow space in the study of history for the creation of human meaning and motivation. As a 
result, their work bears the mark of the modern. Also of particular importance for this German 
pair was the fact that the German Empire had finally entered the Imperial Age. If scholars could 
discover the root of European dominance, they could, at the very least, help maintain it. 
One of the key themes of the fin de siècle was how an entire generation of anxious 
thinkers found new and innovative ways of saying exactly the same thing as previous 
generations. In Becker’s case, he affirmed the commonly held belief that Christianity was far 
more advanced than Islam, but he rejected the notion that Christianity was inherently better or 
more truthful than Islam. He instead argued that Christianity was more advanced because it 
underwent a series of historical and intellectual processes that Islam simply did not. In theory, 
Islam was capable of the very same development, but as Becker noted, it took Christianity 
centuries to reach its modern formulation. The implication is clear.  
Becker’s thesis wasn’t just a symbolic victory for all things Christian and European. He 
firmly believed that his research could be put to good use by the German imperial project, and 
indeed it was. His later essays on colonialism outlined racial and religious hierarchies: white 
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Europeans were a step above Orientals who themselves were a step above black Africans. 
Likewise, Christianity was ranked higher than Islam, which, in turn, was ranked higher than 
paganism. What was most fascinating about Becker’s choice of hierarchies was the renewed 
sense of importance it gave to his earlier work on Islam. According to Becker, Europeans must 
become accustomed to the idea of an Islamic Africa because if given the choice between 
Christianity and Islam, which was precisely the choice European colonizers had hope to impose, 
black Africans would always choose Islam because it was a closer to “the natural forms of black 
thought.” 88 In other words, the transition from paganism to Islam was merely a hop, skip, and a 
jump whereas the transition from paganism straight to Christianity represented too great a chasm. 
Religious forms develop over long periods of time, and Becker argued that trying to eradicate 
Islam would completely undermine Europe’s civilizing project. Islam was an important stepping-
stone for the eventual Christianization of Africa.  
The Second Oriental Renaissance lifted oriental studies to new heights. In the words of 
Enno Littman, taken from a letter written to Carl Becker in September of 1913: 
What [amazing] work has been completed in the last fifteen years! How 
unimaginable our knowledge has been, from all sides, enriched! What new 
perspectives have been opened for us in all, absolutely all, areas of scholarship! 
One is breathless and can hardly keep pace. We live in an era of electricity, even 
in scholarship!89 
 
For German orientalists, the fin de siècle was indeed an age of electricity. German universities 
remained Christian and classical, but new spaces were being opened up for Oriental scholarship. 
New sources inspired new methods. Becker’s scholarship on Islam certainly represented an 
improvement over the previous generation. He challenged the notion that Islam was 
fundamentally timeless and foreign by comparing it to the most familiar of religions: 
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Christianity. He gave Islam a history, and he subjected it to the rigor of intellectual scrutiny. 
Becker was at the cutting-edge of his profession, and the quality of his work placed him in the 
company of great minds like Weber and Durkheim.  
On the other hand, German Orientalism in the fin de siècle was inherently linked to 
empire. Becker was part of a unique cohort, the first generation of scholars that sought to convert 
their knowledge of the Orient into colonial power. Becker eventually gave up his life in 
academia to become a government official and fully pursue the politics of colonialism. Never 




4 CULTURE AND THE STUDY OF HISTORY 
 
In Christianity and Islam, Carl Heinrich Becker developed a view of religious systems 
that not only mirrored, at least to some degree, the theoretical model employed by Émile 
Durkheim in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life but also incorporated some of Max 
Weber’s most pertinent insights on the relationship between culture and history. Broadly 
speaking, the sociology of religion is the application of sociological principles to the study of 
religion, and Becker’s implementation of the sociology of religion places Christianity and Islam 
firmly within the tradition of both Weber and Durkheim. Sociology, a discipline “commonly 
held [to have] crystallized in the nineteenth century against the background of an accelerating 
industrial revolution,” was instrumental in re-making the modern Orient as a worthy object of 
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study.90 Becker’s scholarship, deeply rooted in social and cultural analysis, placed him at odds 
with the third founding father of sociology, Karl Marx. The purpose of this chapter is to re-affirm 
Becker’s connection to the burgeoning field of sociology, envisioned in the present study as a 
community of discourse, by linking his work to the historical debate between Max Weber and 
Karl Marx about the rise of the modern capitalist system. As such, this chapter will juxtapose the 
cultural analysis of Becker and Weber against Marx’s historical materialism. While on the 
subject of culture and history, this chapter will also examine Becker’s work in light of Weber’s 
famous rationalization thesis. My argument is that Becker’s Christianity and Islam represents the 
introduction of rationalization to oriental studies. 
In regard to the development of the world’s major religions, Becker believed culture to be 
of the utmost significance. In Christianity and Islam, Becker draws a clear distinction between 
the ability of the founders of the great religions—Jesus of Nazareth, Muhammad, the Buddha—
to inspire feelings of “true religion in the human heart” versus the intricate religious systems that 
eventually crystallized around their original messages. 91 Durkheim made a similar observation in 
The Elementary Forms when he deliberately selected the Arunta of central Australia as the 
subject of his study. He believed that their “primitive religion” was ripe for scientific 
investigation because their society “exhibited the most simple social structure—structures devoid 
of accretions which accumulate over the course of development.”92 In Durkheim’s view, 
structural accretions hinder the observation of pure phenomenon, but it was these very same 
structural accretions and cultural crystallizations that formed the basis of Becker’s study. 
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Given that Christianity and Islam was a work of history and not theology, Becker was 
primarily concerned with historical development of Christian and Islamic societies and not 
questions of spiritual veracity. Moreover, in order for Becker to compare “like versus like,” he 
had to assume the authenticity of religious feeling in both religions. This, of course, stands in 
stark contrast to Durkheim’s position that religious feeling, while very much real, is actually 
derived from our inherently gregarious tendencies and therefore a sociological phenomenon. A 
second benefit of Becker’s distinction between the authenticity of religious feeling and religious 
systems is that it allowed him, to borrow Durkheim’s language, distinguish the sacred from the 
profane. Oriental studies was a more conservative enterprise than the world of social science 
inhabited by Weber and Durkheim, and it served Becker well to make clear that his historical 
and sociological critique was aimed solely at conspicuous, man-made structures and as such, fell 
strictly within the realm of the profane. 
Furthermore, Becker argued in Christianity and Islam that religious systems resulted 
from the interaction of genuine religious feeling with the “pre-existing capacities of 
civilization.”93 In Becker’s view, “the highest attainments of human life are dependent upon 
circumstances of time and place, and environment often exerts a more powerful influence than 
creative power.”94 In regard to the impact of environmental factors on the development of human 
civilization, Becker sided with Weber and his special emphasis on the primacy of culture over 
the historical materialism of Karl Marx. Becker, for instance, has little to say in Christianity and 
Islam about material conditions and economic activity. It was, instead, the “Greco-Oriental 
culture of later Hellenism,” and neither the material conditions of first-century Galilee nor the 
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economic activity of the Roman Empire that threatened to “[overpower] the teaching of Jesus.”95 
Becker notes a similar course of development for Islam, and he argues that it did not take long 
for the young religion to “assume the spiritual panoply” and defend itself from external threats.96  
Although Weber never completed a full-scale treatment of Islam, he makes a similar 
argument to Becker in other parts of his sociological writings. In Weber and Islam, Bryan S. 
Turner characterizes Weber’s interest in Islam as being split between two different topics: the 
Islamic ethic and the socio-economic structure of later Islamic political dynasties. On the topic of 
the Islamic ethic, Turner recapitulates Weber’s argument as follows: 
Although Islam emerged at Mecca as a monotheistic religion under the prophetic 
supervision of Muhammad, it did not develop into an ascetic this-worldly religion 
because its main social carrier was a warrior group. The content of the religious 
message was transformed into a set of values compatible with the mundane needs 
of a warrior stratum. The salvational element of Islam was transformed into a 
secular quest for land; the result was that Islam became a religion of 
accommodation rather than a religion of transformation.97 
 
Indeed, Weber notes a similar process by which Sufism “catered to the emotional and orgiastic 
needs of the masses,” thereby transforming popular Islam into “a religion of mystical flight.”98 In 
both versions of the Islamic ethic, it was very much the case that “the pristine message of 
Meccan monotheism” was polluted and consequently transformed by what Becker described as 
the “pre-existing capacities of civilization.” As noted by both thinkers, the true religion of the 
holiest prophets is always refashioned by the culture of the particular time and place in which it 
first plants its roots. 
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 In Weber and Islam, Turner also argues that Max Weber derived the majority of his 
working knowledge of Islamic social structures from Becker.99 If Turner’s assertion is correct, 
then it is likely that Weber based some of his conclusions on the Islamic ethic on the following 
passage from Christianity and Islam:  
It would be incorrect for the most part to regard the warrior bands which started 
from Arabia as inspired by religious enthusiasm or to attribute to them the 
fanaticism which was first aroused by the crusades and in an even greater degree 
by the later Turkish wars. The Muhammadan fanatics of the wars of conquest, 
whose reputation was famous among later generations, felt but a very scanty 
interest in religion and occasionally displayed an ignorance of its fundamental 
tenets which we can hardly exaggerate...These impulses were economic and the 
new religion was nothing more than a party cry of unifying power, though there is 
no reason to suppose that it was not a real moral force in the life of Muhammad 
and his immediate contemporaries.100 
 
Becker identified “warrior bands” as the primary “social carrier” of Islam, and in his view, these 
warrior groups—originally Arabian but later mostly Turkish—were motivated first and foremost 
by economic necessity. There’s a sense in which Becker considered these warriors as Muslim in 
name only, and he demonstrated no reservation in describing their ignorance of their own 
religion as existing beyond hyperbole. On a final note, Becker maintains his commitment to the 
authenticity of religious feeling by refusing to undermine the possible religious and moral 
motivations of Muhammad and his earliest followers. Again, there is a clear distinction in 
Becker’s work between true religion and the “pre-existing capacities of civilization.” 
The reason for Weber’s articulation of Islam’s militaristic and mystically aloof ethic was 
to demonstrate its incapability with the rise of capitalism. To be clear, Weber wasn’t dismissing 
the ability of Islamic civilizations to adopt the capitalist system once it was already in existence. 
He was instead suggesting that the orientation of the Islamic ethic predisposed it against the 
emergence of the “ascetic this-worldly” outlook necessary to break the cycle of pre-capitalist 
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economic activity. Take, for example, Weber’s argument—which clearly expands on the work of 
Becker—that the “mundane needs of a warrior stratum” transformed Islam into a “secular quest 
for land.” In Christianity and Islam, Becker argued that Islam routinely incorporated Christian 
ideas regardless of whether those ideas actually corresponded to the material activity of Islam’s 
warrior stratum: 
Either religion regards man as no more than a sojourner in this world. It is not 
worth while to arrange for a permanent habitation, and luxurious living is but 
pride. Hence the simplicity of private dwellings in medieval times both in the East 
and West. Architectural expense is confined to churches and mosques, which 
were intended for the service of God. These Christian ideas are reflected in the 
inexhaustible storehouse of Muhammadan theory, the great collections of 
traditions, as follows: “The worst use which a believer can make of his money is 
to build." "Every building, except a mosque, will stand to discredit of its architect 
on the day of resurrection." These polemics, which Islam inherited from 
Christianity, are directed not only against building in general, but also against the 
decoration of lofty edifices…These theories were out of harmony with the  
worldly tendencies of the conquerors, who built themselves castles, such as [Qasr] 
Amra: they belong to the spirit of Christianity rather than to Islam.101 
 
The key difference between Christianity and Islam, at least in practice, was the latter’s emphasis 
of temporality over spirituality. On a theoretical and theological plane, both Abrahamic religions 
considered “man as no more a sojourner in this world.” As a result of the present life 
representing a mere prelude to the next one, Christians and Muslims were implored to donate 
their money to their church or to their mosque instead of investing in greater comfort and luxury, 
but in Becker’s view, Islam’s commendation of modest accommodations channeled the spirit of 
Christianity rather than essence of its own religious tradition. To support his argument, Becker 
cites the incredible ease with which the economic activity of Islam’s “worldly conquerors” 
thwarted the religious virtue of humility. If modest accouterments were in fact ingrained in the 
spirit of Islam, then the construction of elaborate fortifications—such as Qasr Amra in the early 
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eighth century—would have neither taken place nor would they have been accepted by Muslim 
locals. The implication of this particular argument, however, was that Europeans adhered to the 
spirit of Christianity by refusing to build ornate castles, a claim that certainly represents a wild 
stretch of the imagination. 
 Nevertheless, it was Becker’s contention that religious beliefs exerted a dominant 
influence on economic activity in Europe while positing the reverse scenario in the Orient. This 
position not only represented a common strain of thought between Becker and Weber, but it also 
acted as the point of departure for Weber’s Protestant Ethic. In The Protestant Ethic, as well as 
some of his sociological writings on Islam, Weber described religious ethics as being wholly 
separate from the original intentions of each religion’s earliest practitioners. As such, the 
Protestant and Islamic ethics are essentially cultural formations, a synthesis—or dialectic—of 
new religious ideas with old cultural institutions. In the case of Weber’s most famous study, he 
argued that the origin of capitalism was linked with the emergence of a unique religious belief: 
the doctrine of double predestination. In Weber’s words, it was “by the decree of God, for the 
manifestation of His glory, some men…are predestined unto everlasting life, and others 
foreordained to everlasting death.”102 According to Peter Baehr and Gordon C. Wells, Weber 
maintained that the theological position of predestination produced within Calvinist believers an 
enduring crisis of “proof”—of demonstrating to oneself that one was among the 
chosen spiritual elite—fashioned a distinctive kind of individual…Unable to find 
solace in the sacraments or in the image of a kindly God, aware that their 
neighbors, even their family, may be among the perpetually condemned, Calvinist 
believers were psychologically isolated. Their distance from God could only be 
precariously bridged, and their inner tensions only partially relieved, by 
unstinting, purposeful labor. The result was innerworldly rational asceticism: 
rigorous, scrupulous, methodical work within a calling.103 
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In similar fashion to C. H. Becker, Weber advanced the argument that religious belief molded the 
character of economic activity. It is also important to keep in mind that the concept of 
predestination emerged almost a millennium and half after the ministry of Jesus Christ, a fact 
that demonstrates the cultural and, to some extent, sociological nature of religious beliefs and 
practices. Recalling the work of Durkheim, the core doctrine of Calvinism represented an 
accretion—fundamentally cultural in nature—that complicated the simplicity of Christianity’s 
underlying social structure.104 In summation, both Becker and Weber were deeply concerned 
with the profound sociological impact on human behavior, particularly economic activity, which 
specific cultural ideas, often in the form of religious dogmas, could produce on entire 
civilizations. 
In keeping with Weber’s views on culture, Becker makes the point in Christianity and 
Islam that “dissensions [in Christianity] persist even now because millions of people are unable 
to distinguish pure religion [the original teaching of Jesus] from the forms of expression 
belonging to an extinct culture [the Greco-Oriental culture of later Hellenism].”105 Furthermore, 
he argued that Christianity and Islam emerged from the same cultural milieu: classical antiquity. 
Despite their common cultural heritage, there could be, in Becker’s estimation, no denying the 
increasing gulf between Christian Europe and the Islamic Orient. Weber’s argument, as 
previously noted, was that the Protestant ethic, an ascetic this-worldly outlook, engendered a 
pattern of behavior that, while not exclusively sufficient, was certainly necessary for the 
development of capitalist institutions. For Becker, on the other hand, it was the cultural 
experience of the Renaissance that set the West on a wholly divergent path to modern capitalism. 
                                                 
104
 Pickering, Durkheim’s Sociology of Religion, 103. 
105
 Becker, Christianity and Islam, 35. 
47 
The sociology of religion, as practiced by Weber and Becker, emphasized the 
significance of culture in both the historical development of religious systems as well as in 
guiding human action. Despite their disagreement on the origins of European hegemony, both 
scholars provided an explanation that was fundamentally cultural. Karl Marx, on the other hand, 
offered an account of capitalism and Western dominance that was completely devoid of cultural 
analysis. Whereas Weber and Becker discounted the potential Islamic origins of capitalism on 
account of the Islamic ethic and the Renaissance, respectively, Marx dismissed what he called 
the Asiatic Mode of Production on geographic grounds. In “The British Rule in India,” first 
published in the New-York Daily Tribune on June 25, 1853, Marx described geographic 
conditions stretching from the Western Sahara to India as being unconducive to the abolishment 
of the feudal system or, in some cases, slave society.106 Again, Marx’s argument is that political, 
legal, and cultural development is predicated on changes to the economic base, and in the case of 
non-European civilizations, the climate—not to mention the material conditions that accompany 
it—prevented any meaningful changes to the mode of production in regard to both its means and 
its social organization. 
Although Marx never fully developed his theory of history, its most rudimentary 
formulation can be found in The German Ideology. Co-written with Friedrich Engels in 1845, 
The German Ideology possesses all the basic components of the materialist conception of history, 
even if it lacks the more technical terminology that characterized Marx’s later writings. Rejecting 
the idealism of his mentor G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831), who posited that human beings impose 
categories of understanding onto reality, Marx rooted the first principles of historical inquiry in 
the physical and empirical certainties of the real world. It was for this reason that Marx argued 
that the “first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human 
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individuals.”107 Moreover, these individuals “begin to distinguish themselves from animals as 
soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their 
physical organization. By producing their means of subsistence men are indirectly producing 
their actual material life.”108 In other words, individuals construct and participate in a mode of 
production that encompasses both the means of production, which is to say the technology, labor, 
and eventually capital necessary for “[producing] their means of subsistence,” and the network of 
well-defined social relations that govern the interactions between individuals and property. The 
former is conditioned by the latter insofar that technology and labor can only be organized within 
the confines of an already established social order. 
What is most notable about Marx’s conception of history—at least in regard to the 
present study—is its commitment to material causality. In The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis 
Bonaparte (1851), a classical example of historical materialism in practice, Marx famously 
remarked that  
Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do 
not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under the 
circumstances directly found, given, and transmitted from the past. The tradition 
of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living.109 
 
For Marx, the inherited circumstances of humankind are fundamentally material, and as a result, 
the root cause of historical change must always originate with the means of production. 
According to Bryan S. Turner, “traditional Marxism [maintains that] either the economic base is 
the cause of events that take place in the superstructure of law and politics or the struggle 
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between social classes is the causal agent.”110 The struggle between social classes over the means 
of production is, in Marx’s view, the primary mechanism through which human civilizations 
transition from one historical epoch to the next. Although contemporary Marxists have 
undoubtedly distanced themselves from the teleological pitfalls of this particular schematic, the 
central role of class conflict remains integral to Marxian analysis. More important to the current 
study, however, is Marx’s argument that changes in the superstructure are caused by changes in 
the economic base. In this view, historical changes in the organization of labor power coupled 
with technological innovations engender corresponding changes in political and legal systems. 
Although the base-superstructure model is a testament to Marx’s dialectical thinking, the 
superstructure is always junior partner to the economic base, i.e. the only true engine of historical 
change. 
 Conventional wisdom maintains that Max Weber’s Protestantic Ethic represented a 
rejoinder to Marx’s historical materialism.111 In Marx’s view, the seizure of the means of 
production by the bourgeoisie in European society marked the end of the feudal age and the 
emergence of the capitalist system. Any future transition from capitalism to socialism is 
contingent upon the working class wresting control of the means of production from the 
bourgeoisie. A key theme in Marx’s understanding of historical epochs is that an increasingly 
large number of people gain unfettered access to the means of production with each successive 
stage of development. Greater control over the means of production essentially allows 
individuals to exert greater control over producing the means of their own subsistence. Weber, 
on the other hand, rejected Marx’s material conception of history by suggesting that attempts to 
raise economic productivity in pre-capitalist Europe by increasing piece rates were unmitigated 
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failures. Instead of “working harder and longer [to become richer],” workers in traditional 
societies stopped pursuing economic activities once they reached their customary wage.112 For 
Weber, changes in the economic base alone were insufficient in explaining the emergence of not 
only an entirely unprecedented mode of production, i.e. capitalism, but also the proliferation of 
an entrepreneurial and distinctly modern mentality.  
 The debate between Karl Marx and Max Weber represents the crystallization of distinct 
and historically significant community of discourse. Ken Morrison framed their debate in terms 
of the birth of structural theory—a school of thought that sought to examine isolated social fields 
in order to understand human behavior. In addition to Émile Durkheim, Max and Weber are 
often cited as the founding fathers of modern sociology. Historians have classified Carl Heinrich 
Becker as both a traditional orientalist and a staunch imperialist, but it is my contention that 
Becker was participating in larger community of discourse. Becker’s Islamic Kulturgeschichte 
placed a special emphasis on culture as a framework for understanding human behavior, 
especially in regard to the historical development of Christianity and Islam. Becker, Marx, and 
Weber unanimously agreed on the overpowering nature of economic activity in the Orient. Marx 
described the Asiatic Mode of Production in terms of geographical determinism while Becker 
and Weber interpreted the Orient as the site of perpetual conquest. The more spiritual aspects of 
Islam, demonstrated by Becker to be primarily of Christian origin, were undermined and snuffed 
out in light of economic and material realities. Where these thinkers diverged, however, was on 
the relationship between the mode of production and the function of culture in early modern 
Europe. For Marx, base precedes superstructure in all cases, but Becker and Weber argued that 
culture, particular culture infused with religious significance, was the primary mover of men in 
Europe after the Renaissance and Reformation. Becker, for instance, attributed “the simplicity of 
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private dwellings in medieval times both in the East and West” to the aesthetic spirit of 
Christianity instead of the material limitations of feudalism.113 He also interpreted the parallel 
historical development of Christianity and Islam as fundamentally similar expressions of 
Hellenic culture. Furthermore, it was the great cultural flourishing of the Renaissance, not the 
Industrial Revolution, which ushered in the dawn of a new capitalist age. Christianity and Islam 
exhibits deep affinities with Weber’s Protestant Ethic, and the texts stand united in their 
opposition to Marx’s historical materialism. On a final note, Becker’s Christianity and Islam 











While other historians have noted Carl Heinrich Becker’s essential role in modernizing 
oriental studies, the purpose of the present study has been to examine the precise methods and 
intellectuals tools that Becker employed in order to shift the emphasis of oriental studies from 
the ancient to the modern world. My central argument has been that Becker utilized the 
sociology of religion, a field most often associated with the works of Max Weber and Émile 
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Durkheim, as his methodology of choice. My thesis also advanced the argument that Christianity 
and Islam, a text that has received relatively little attention from historians, represented Becker’s 
finest achievement as a scholar. In Christianity and Islam, Becker conceived of religion as a 
complex cultural system that evolved over time, and his sociological and historical-minded 
approach represented a fierce rejoinder to the theological and ecclesiastical modes of thought 
that dominated oriental studies until the early twentieth century.  
More importantly, however, Christianity and Islam demonstrated that Becker was a key 
intellectual at the turn of the twentieth century. Becker’s work transcended the limitations of 
oriental studies by taking seriously the notion that religious belief possessed a history of its own. 
Christianity and Islam represents the formulation of Islamic Kulturgeschichte, a mode of cultural 










,wider and historically significant implications.  
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At the heart of Weber’s thesis in The Protestant Ethic lies a paradox. In the work’s 
conclusion, Weber writes:  
As asceticism began to change the world and endeavored to exercise its influence 
over it, the outward goods of this world gained increasing and finally inescapable 
power over men, as never before seen in history. Today its spirit has fled from 
this shell—whether for all time, who knows? Certainly, victorious capitalism has 
no further need for this support now that it rests on the foundation of the machine. 
Even the optimistic mood of its laughing heir, the Enlightenment, seems destined 
to fade away, and the idea of “duty in a calling” haunts our lives like the ghost of 
once-held religious belief.114 
 
Weber’s argument was that the Protestant work ethic, which was responsible for endowing work 
with religious and cultural significance and therefore instilling the spirit of capitalism in the 
minds of Calvinist believers, has long since been fundamentally undermined by the very same 
economic system it put into place. Capitalism, once fully developed, “obeys its own formal logic 
of production, accumulation, and exchange, and no longer requires any form of spiritual 
legitimation.”115 In similar fashion, mature capitalism has eschewed the value-rationality 
(Wertrationalität) of Protestantism in favor of instrumental rationality (Zweckrationalität). 
Instrumental rationality finds its most powerful cultural expression in the form in modern 
science, and although science once represented the pursuit of God’s eternal truths, it now 
“proceeds to denude all religious belief, [including those of Protestantism], denigrating them as 
irrational forms of superstition or myth regardless of their intrinsic rationality or value.”116 
Whereas Émile Durkheim believed in the moral nature of science and its positive impact on 
human progress, Weber was decidedly counter-Enlightenment.  [diological turn book] 
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It’s important to keep in mind that Marx considered culture to be a function of the 
superstructure. Culture, like political and legal infrastructures, acts as a mere reflection of 
society’s material conditions. 
 
In Max Weber and Postmodern Theory, Nicholas Gane argues that Weber’s sociology of 
religion, as demonstrated in The Protestant Ethic, was merely a subset of his larger critique of 
modernity. As such, he considers “the work of Weber, like that of Nietzsche, [as identifying] in 
the general process of enlightenment a movement towards nihilism, [defined as the devaluation 
of ultimate values], in the West, and [as holding] scientific rationalization to be not a cure but a 
key contributory factor to this process.”117 The legacy of Protestantism, in Weber’s view, was the 
introduction of the two most powerful modes of devaluation known to humankind: capitalism 
and modern science. Not only do both systems embrace an aggressive brand of means-ends 
instrumentality, but they’re also relentless and totalizing in their disenchantment of the world. It 
should be noted here that Gane considers Weber’s stance on the Enlightenment as the point of 
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departure for both the Frankfurt school and the postmodern theorists Jean-François Lyotard, 
Michel Foucault, and Jean Baudrillard.118 
 If rationalization and disenchantment are at the heart of Weber’s research 
paradigm, then Carl Becker’s work represents the introduction of these themes to oriental 
studies. Becker, much like Durkheim, believed that he was conducting scientific research. 
Durkheim considered The Elementary Forms of Religious Life to represent an experimentum 
cruces from which to deduce the laws of religion. According to W.S.F. Pickering, “Durkheim 
felt that to concentrate on one society and focus on its religious institutions as a whole was a far 
superior methodological procedure than to follow the one then in vogue, the comparative 
method.”119 In this sense, Durkheim’s version of the sociology of religion was fundamentally 
different from the one employed by Becker in Christianity and Islam. 
Although Becker was never explicit in Christianity and Islam about the scientific weight 
of his findings, his personal letters to the Dutch orientalist Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje (1857-
1936) in 1914 indicate a whole-hearted belief in the scientific nature of his work. He was, for 
instance, “terribly upset” by the accusation that he, along with his fellow Germans, was 
practicing “politicized science.” 120 In Becker’s view, not only did the comparative method 
render scholarship that was historical and sociological for its own sake, but it also produced 
useful knowledge of the Orient that could be put to use by the state. Becker’s moral outrage at 
Snouck Hurgronje’s accusation rested in the fact that he detected no conflict of interest between 
scholarly research and colonial politics.  
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In German Orientalism in the Age of Empire, Marchand argues that Martin Hartmann and 
Carl Becker represented a break from the orientalist tradition insofar that they renounced 
theology and philology in favor of “[putting] their knowledge to political use.”121 They were, in 
other words, committed to German colonialism. Marchand’s interpretation of Hartmann and 
Becker suggests a relationship between oriental knowledge and colonial power, but perhaps an 
alternate reading of their scholarship might suggest a shift in oriental studies from value-
rationality to instrumental rationality. The function of oriental scholarship aimed at theological, 
or even philological, ends must certainly have something to do with legitimating certain religious 
beliefs and practices, especially in regard to Hebrew studies. This sort of scholarship is, in other 
words, directed at affirming religious values. Becker’s Christianity and Islam, on the other hand, 
challenges many of these values by completely altering the method through which oriental 
scholarship had been traditionally conducted. By distinguishing between religious feeling and 
religious systems and subjecting the historical development of religious systems to the sociology 
of religion, Becker’s study was essentially devaluing, which is to say disenchanting, the religious 
beliefs and practices—at least as they understood them—of countless Christians and Muslims.  
Although there’s a case to be made that Christianity and Islam is neutral on the topic of 
instrumentalizing oriental knowledge, Becker’s later scholarship and future political career 
leaves little doubt as to his views on the matter. The presence of instrumental rationality is most 
evident in his work on Africa and Islam. According to Gottfried Hagen, “Becker dismissed 
[Christian] missionaries’ fears about the spread of Islam in German colonies in Africa, arguing 
that Islamization was in fact inevitable, and would facilitate colonial rule.”122 Becker’s reasoning 
was that Islam was closer than Christianity to “the natural forms of black thought” and that 
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scholarly knowledge of Islam, and therefore colonial power over Islam, was far more developed 
than their current understanding of African paganism.123  
The scholarship of Martin Hartmann and, more notably, Carl Heinrich Becker, with its 
point of emphasis on the modern instead of the ancient Orient, represents a profound rupture in 
the history of oriental scholarship. The purpose of this chapter has been to demonstrate that such 
a cosmic shift would not have been possible without the invention and implementation of both a 
new methodology and a new way of thinking about the relationship between culture and history. 
My argument is that the sociology of religion, most famously developed by Max Weber and 
Émile Durkheim, provided Becker with the necessary means of lifting the Orient out of the past 
and delivering it into the present. Additionally, I have used the historical materialism of Karl 
Marx as a point of contrast in order to explore Weber’s—and by extension, Becker’s—
conception of culture, history, and human agency. Finally, I have demonstrated that by siding 
with Max Weber’s views on culture, Becker also adopted the same germs of rationalization and 
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